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Clarifying What is “Clear”: Reconsidering 
Whistleblower Protections Under Dodd-Frank 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
it.”1 
“Honesty  is the best policy—when there is  the  most  money  in 
 
The  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (“SEC”)  seems to 
fully support this statement. The 2014 fiscal year was a momentous one 
for whistleblower actions with over 3,600 whistleblower tips received 
and a record-breaking whistleblower award.2 In September 2014, the 
SEC announced an award of more than $30 million,3 more than double 
the previous record of $14 million in 2013.4 The Chief of the SEC 
Office of the Whistleblower, Sean McKessy, “hope[s] that awards like 
this one will incentivize company and industry insiders, or others who 
may have knowledge of possible federal securities law violations, both 
in the [United States] and abroad, to come forward and report their 
information promptly to the Commission.”5 
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer  
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”),6 Congress sought to increase 
corporate accountability and transparency by incentivizing the reporting 
of potential securities law violations.7 To do this, the whistleblower 
program  provides  for  “monetary  awards,  retaliation  protection,  and 
 
 
1. Mark Twain Tells of His Business Ventures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1901, at 2. 
2. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., 2014 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1–3 (2014), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf. 
3. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., SEC Announces Largest-Ever 
Whistleblower Award (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290#.VC9e0PldXg 
k. 
4. Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC to Pay $30 Million Whistleblower Award, Its Largest 
Yet, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-pay-30-million- 
whistleblower-award-its-largest-yet-1411406612. 
5. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 2, at 1. 
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §  
922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). 
7.    S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010). 
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confidentiality protection.”8 It is unclear, however, who is considered a 
whistleblower under the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections.9  
Courts have split within the last few years over whether a whistleblower 
must report suspected violations directly to the SEC, or if internal 
reporting is sufficient to claim the benefits of Dodd-Frank’s anti- 
retaliation provisions.10 In Asadi v. G.E. Energy,11 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed the narrow definition of 
“whistleblower” found in § 78u–6(a)(6) (“Definition Section”) of Dodd- 
Frank, holding that an employee must report directly to the SEC to be 
protected by Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions. This narrow 
Definition Section directly conflicts with § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (“Anti- 
retaliation Section”),12 which permits a civil action by an employee for 
an adverse employment action if the employee has made an internal 
disclosure protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).13 
SOX provides protection for whistleblowers who report only internally 
and not to the SEC.14 To reconcile this conflict, district courts in the 
First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the Anti- 
retaliation Section extends protections under Dodd-Frank to those who 
choose to report internally and not directly to the SEC.15 The Fifth 
Circuit, however, is the only circuit court that has addressed who is 
protected by Dodd-Frank’s  whistleblower  provisions.16  Thus, currently 
 
8. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 2, at 1. 
9. Steve Kardell, 2014: A Big Year in Whistleblower Laws, JDSUPRA BUS. 
ADVISOR (June 5, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2014-a-big-year-in- 
whistleblower-laws-52978/. 
10. Id. 
11.    720 F.3d 620, 625–26 (5th Cir. 2013). 
12. This Note focuses on one of three categories of protected actions listed in the anti- 
retaliation provisions found in Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 922(h)(1)(A), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). The 
Anti-retaliation Section refers to only Dodd-Frank § 922(h)(1)(A)(iii), codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
13.   Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
14. Id. 
15. See Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y 2014); Khazin v. 
TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW) (MCA), 2014 WL 940703, at  *6 
(D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-cv-523-GHW-SN, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168840, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4 2014); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., 
No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501,  at  *1  (M.D.  Fla. May 12, 2014); Verfuerth 
v. Orion Energy Sys., No. 14-C-352, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156620, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 
4, 2014); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp, No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *1  
(D. Colo. July 19, 2013). 
16. The Eighth Circuit declined to hear an interlocutory appeal on the issue and the 
Second Circuit denied  an appeal on other  grounds.  Bussing v.  COR  Clearing,  LLC,  No. 
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in some jurisdictions, employees must report to the SEC to be protected 
under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.17 
This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s holding should be 
disregarded and the definition of a whistleblower should be expanded to 
include those who report potential securities laws violations internally, 
in addition to those who report directly to the SEC.18 This  Note  
proceeds in four parts. Part II explains the differences between the anti- 
retaliation provisions of SOX and Dodd-Frank.19 Part III provides an 
overview of the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in adopting a 
restrictive definition of whistleblower in Asadi.20 Part IV discusses how 
the majority of courts choose not to follow the Fifth Circuit after 
correctly applying either the two step process set forth in Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.21 or the new textualism 
doctrine.22 Part V concludes with an analysis of the practical 
implications of a narrow definition for employees, employers’ internal 
compliance programs, and the SEC.23 
II. THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS: SOX AND DODD-FRANK 
 
The Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions were not Congress’s 
first attempt to protect corporate whistleblowers.24 Section 806 of SOX 
provides that “no company . . . may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an 
employee  in the terms and  conditions of employment  because  of  any 
 
 
8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278, at *1 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014) (interlocutory appeal 
denied); Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, 978 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013) 
(holding Dodd-Frank does not apply interterritorially). There is currently an appeal in the 
Third Circuit, where the SEC has filed an amicus brief in favor of overruling the Fifth 
Circuit’s narrow definition of a whistleblower. Brief for the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Safarian v. American DG Energy, No. 14-2734 
(3rd Cir. Dec. 12, 2014). 
17. Id. 
18. Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013). 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. See infra Part III. 
21.    467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. Stephen M. Kohn, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legal Protection for Corporate 
Whistleblowers, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27 (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
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lawful act done by the employee.”25 This SOX  anti-retaliation  
provision protects employees of public companies and their 
subsidiaries26 who internally report potential securities law violations.27 
Dodd-Frank includes anti-retaliation protections that mirror the SOX 
protections.28 Dodd-Frank also created a bounty program,29 which 
recently resulted in an over $30 million reward, that provides  a 
monetary incentive for whistleblowers who report directly to the SEC.30 
Under the bounty program, a whistleblower whose original information 
leads to successful enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative 
action is entitled to receive between 10% and 30% of the monetary 
sanctions imposed.31 Therefore, whistleblowers are more likely to bring 
a claim under Dodd-Frank because of its plaintiff-friendly benefits.32 
There are three key differences between SOX and Dodd-Frank 
that could influence under which law an employee decides to bring a 
claim.33 First, under SOX, an employee may be eligible to receive back 
pay following a  retaliatory discharge,34   while  under  Dodd-Frank,  the 
 
 
 
25.   Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012). 
26. SOX provisions provide “anti-retaliation protections for employees of public 
companies, subsidiaries whose financial information is included in the consolidated  
financial statements of public companies, and nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations.” Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 
34304 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249) (emphasis added). 
27. See Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 
2013) (offering whistleblower protection for violations of mail fraud, wire  fraud,  bank 
fraud, federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders, or any rule or regulation of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission); SOX § 806(a)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C). 
28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 
922(h)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). 
29. The monetary award program is separate from the retaliation protections. It does 
not require an adverse employment action to receive an award under Dodd-Frank. The anti- 
retaliation provisions are meant to protect employees, who may be motivated by the reward, 
that suffer an adverse employment action as a result of coming forward. See Dodd-Frank § 
922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6; OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 2. 
30. LINDA SHEN, WEIL, GOTSHALL & MANGES LLP, UPDATE: COURTS CONTINUE TO BE 
DIVIDED OVER THE SCOPE OF DODD-FRANK’S ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTIONS 4 (July 2014), 
available at https://interact.weil.com/reaction/mailings/Employer_Update_July_2014.pdf. 
31.    Dodd-Frank § 922(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
32. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014). 
33. Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013). 
34. Back pay damages under are restitutionary damages intended to “make the 
employee whole.” Walton v. Nova Info. Sys., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Tenn. 
2007). The back pay awarded is the amount the whistleblower “would have received had 
their employment not been terminated.” Schmidt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 621 F.  Supp. 2d 
796, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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employee is eligible for double the back pay.35 Second, under SOX, an 
employee must first file a claim with the Occupational Safety  and 
Health Administration (“OSHA”).36 If 180 days pass without a final 
agency order, then the whistleblower may file an action in federal 
district court.37 Dodd-Frank, on the other hand, gives a whistleblower 
direct access to district court to file a claim.38 Third, the statute of 
limitations under SOX to report a claim is 180 days from the violation  
or knowledge of the violation.39 Dodd-Frank requires an action be 
brought no more than six years after the date on which the violation 
occurred or no more than three years after the material facts of the 
violation first became known.40 The statute of limitations period, 
however, cannot be tolled for more than ten years after the date on 
which the violation occurred.41 
Federal courts are split on whether the Dodd-Frank anti- 
retaliation provisions apply to whistleblowers who only report internally 
and not to the SEC.42 The Dodd-Frank Definition Section defines a 
whistleblower as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals 
acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the 
securities  laws43   to  the  [SEC],  in  a  manner  established,  by  rule  or 
 
 
35. Compare Dodd-Frank § 922(h)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii), with SOX 
§ 806(c)(2)(B), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B). 
36. SOX § 806(b)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMIN. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OHSA FACT SHEET: FILING WHISTLEBLOWER 
COMPLAINTS UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter FILING 
WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS], available at https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha- 
factsheet-sox-act.pdf. 
37. FILING WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS, supra note 36, at 2. 
38. Shen, supra note 30, at 4. 
39. SOX § 806(b)(2)(D), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D); FILING WHISTLEBLOWER 
COMPLAINTS, supra note 36, at 2. 
40. Dodd-Frank  Wall   Street  Reform  and   Consumer  Protection   Act (Dodd-Frank) 
§ 922(h)(1)(B)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2012). 
41. Id. 
42. Catherine Foti, If You See Something, Say Something, But Maybe Only to the SEC, 
JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (June 19, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/if-you- 
see-something-say-something-but-77891/. 
43. It also has been recently held that to be protected by Dodd-Frank, an employee’s 
disclosure must “relate to a violation of the securities laws.” Zillges v. Kenney Bank & 
Trust, No. 13-C-1287, 2014 WL 2515403, at *5 (E.D. Wis. June 4, 2014). This is not a new 
development since the statute, courts, and the SEC use the phrase “securities laws” when 
referring to the violations that must be reported. See Dodd-Frank § 922(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-6(a)(6); Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 
34300 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249); see, e.g., Nollner v. S. 
Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). 
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regulation, by the [SEC].”44 Dodd-Frank also outlines three categories  
of protected actions protecting, whistleblowers from employer 
retaliation for any act taken by the whistleblower 
 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in 
accordance with this section; 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any 
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the 
Commission based upon or related to such information; 
or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and any other 
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission.45 
 
Despite this language, the Anti-retaliation Section appears to 
protect employees who have not reported to the SEC46 because the SOX 
provisions protect internal disclosures made to “a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee.”47 Thus, the Dodd-Frank Anti-
retaliation Section directly conflicts with the Definition Section that 
requires reporting to the SEC.48 Although most courts have  resolved 
this conflict by holding that the Dodd-Frank Anti-retaliation Section 
protects internal reports made under SOX, the Fifth Circuit in Asadi 
applied a strict interpretation of the statute and rejected the notion that a 
conflict existed.49 
To clarify these conflicting provisions, the SEC promulgated 
regulations in 2011 that clarified the scope of whistleblower programs  
to potential whistleblowers.50    According to the SEC’s regulations,  you 
 
44.    Dodd-Frank § 922(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
45.    Dodd-Frank § 922(h)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
46. Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW) (MCA), 2014 WL 
940703, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014). 
47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) § 806(a)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) 
(2012). 
48. Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 25, 2013). 
49. Catherine Foti, When Is a ‘Whistleblower’ Not Really a ‘Whistleblower’?, FORBES 
(Aug. 7, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/08/07/when-is-a- 
whistleblower-not-really-a-whistleblower/. 
50. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34300 
(June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). 
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are a whistleblower if you have a reasonable belief of a possible 
securities law violation, and if you have provided information in any 
manner described in the Dodd-Frank Anti-retaliation Section 
whistleblower provisions, which includes reports made under SOX.51 
While the majority of courts have accepted and deferred to the SEC’s 
regulations, a minority of courts have held that the Anti-retaliation 
Section only protects employees who report directly to the SEC.52 
III. FIFTH CIRCUIT: REQUIRING WHISTLEBLOWERS TO REPORT TO THE 
SEC 
 
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy, the Fifth Circuit held, contrary to five 
federal district courts,53 that employees who only reported internally and 
not to the SEC were not protected under the Dodd-Frank Anti- 
retaliation Section.54 Asadi, an employee at General Electric Energy 
(“G.E. Energy”), reported a potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”) violation internally to his supervisor.55 Shortly thereafter, he 
began receiving negative performance reviews and was subsequently 
fired.56 Asadi asserted that G.E. Energy violated Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower protection provisions by retaliating after he reported the 
potential FCPA violation to his supervisor, but not the SEC.57 The Fifth 
Circuit held that Asadi was not entitled to protection under Dodd-Frank 
because he did not provide information directly to the SEC.58 
The Fifth Circuit began and ended its analysis with the 
determination that the statutory language in Dodd-Frank was plain and 
unambiguous.59      Asadi  conceded  that  he  was  not  within  the  Dodd- 
 
 
51. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(i) 
(2014) (referring to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- 
Frank) §922(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (2012)). 
52. Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153439, at 
*13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014). 
53. Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Kramer v. Trans–Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 
4444820, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 
8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
54. Foti, supra note 49. 
55. Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013). 
56. Id. 
57.    Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623. 
58.    Foti, supra note 42. 
59.    Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623. 
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Frank’s definition of a whistleblower since he did not report directly to 
the SEC.60 Nevertheless, he argued that employees who  took  the  
actions listed in the Dodd-Frank Anti-retaliation Section were 
protected.61 Specifically, Asadi argued he was entitled to anti-  
retaliation protection as an employee who reported a potential securities 
law violation to his superiors because Dodd-Frank incorporates  the 
SOX whistleblower provisions.62 The Fifth Circuit stated that Asadi  
was “correct that individuals may take [a] protected activity yet still not 
qualify as a whistleblower,” but maintained the term “whistleblower” 
must be defined narrowly.63 As a  result, retaliation is prohibited only  
for actions taken by whistleblowers who report to the SEC in  
accordance with the Definition Section.64 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress’s repeated use of the 
term “whistleblower” in the Anti-retaliation Section was intentional.65 
According to this section, “[n]o employer may discharge . . . or in any 
other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower . . . because of any 
lawful act done by the whistleblower.”66 Had Congress used the terms 
“individual” or “employee,” then Asadi’s interpretation of the 
whistleblower protections would make more sense.67 “The use of such 
broader terms would indicate that Congress intended any individual or 
employee—not just those individuals or employees who qualify as a 
‘whistleblower’—to be protected from retaliatory actions by their 
employers.”68 Because of this strict reading of the text, the court held 
that Dodd-Frank only protects actions and disclosures listed in the Anti- 
retaliation Section if the employee also disclosed information to the 
SEC.69 
To reach its interpretation, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the 
Definition Section and Anti-retaliation Section using two key canons of 
 
 
60.    Id. at 624. 
61.   Id. 
62.    Id. at 626. 
63.    Id. at 627. 
64.    Id. at 629. 
65. Id. at 626 (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank) § 922(h)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012)). 
66. Id. (emphasis added). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69.    Id. at 627. 
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statutory construction.70 The court not only tried to interpret the two 
sections in “a manner that render[ed] them compatible, not 
contradictory,”71 but also tried to prevent any phrase from becoming 
“superfluous, void, or insignificant.”72  Asadi argued that by requiring   
an employee to report to the SEC in the Definition Section, the Anti- 
retaliation Section is rendered moot.73 The court noted, however, that 
Asadi’s reading not only makes the words “provide information . . . to 
the Commission” superfluous, but also undermines SOX as a whole.74   
If the Anti-retaliation Section incorporated SOX whistleblower 
provisions for all employees, no individual would ever choose to raise a 
SOX anti-retaliation claim over a Dodd-Frank claim.75 
To avoid surplusage, the Fifth Circuit gave effect to every word 
in the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions by clarifying that internal 
reporting under the Anti-retaliation Section only protects who report to 
the SEC.76 The court posed a hypothetical of a mid-level manager who 
reported securities law violations to his company’s CEO and to the 
SEC.77 If the manager was fired before the CEO knew of the report to 
the SEC,78 the manager could still bring a claim under the Dodd-Frank 
Anti-retaliation Section.79 The manager met the requirement in the 
Definition Section of reporting to the SEC, but was retaliated against for 
internal reporting, which is a protected action under the Anti-retaliation 
Section.80 The manager would still have the option to bring either a  
SOX or Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation claim.81 
In interpreting the Dodd-Frank Definition Section and Anti- 
retaliation   Section,   the   court   used   traditional   tools   of   statutory 
 
70.    Id. at 622. 
71. Id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133  
(2000)). 
72. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
73.    Id. at 628. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76.    Id. at 629. 
77.    Id. at 627. 
78. The SEC has pointed out that this causes a problem because “if an employer is 
genuinely unaware that the employee has separately disclosed to the Commission, any 
adverse employment action that the employer takes would appear to lack the requisite 
retaliatory intent—i.e., the intent to punish the employee for engaging in a protected 
activity.”  Brief of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, supra note 16, at 23. 
79.    Asadi, 720 F.3d. at 627–28. 
80.    Id. at 628. 
81. Id. 
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construction, but failed to truly follow the process outlined in the 
landmark case of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.82 
Because of this, courts widely cite Asadi when considering the issue of 
who qualifies for Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections, but the 
majority of federal district courts faced with the issue have declined to 
follow Asadi’s interpretation.83 Instead, courts are choosing to defer to 
the SEC’s regulations that expand the definition of “whistleblower.”84 
District courts are left without much guidance as the Fifth Circuit is the 
only circuit that has ruled on this issue.85 Both the Court of Appeals for 
the Second and Eighth Circuits had the opportunity to clarify 
whistleblower protections, but both chose instead to sidestep the issue.86 
In  Liu  v.  Siemens  AG,87   the  Second  Circuit  held  that Dodd- 
Frank does not apply extraterritorially to a plaintiff who was a citizen of 
Taiwan, who worked for a Chinese corporation that had shares listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange.88 In its opinion, the Second Circuit did 
not address the debate over the whistleblower  definition.89  
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit refused to resolve the issue of whether 
an employee must report to the SEC to be protected by the Dodd-Frank 
 
82. Id. at 630; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
83. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) 
(protecting internal reports); Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (same); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013) (same). But 
see Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., No. 14-C-352, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156620, at *1, 
(E.D. Wis. Nov. 4, 2014) (requiring reports be made to the SEC); Englehart v. Career Educ. 
Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) 
(same). 
84. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014); 
Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
85. Catherine Foti, Did the Summer Shine Any Light on Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Land?, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2014, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2014/09/11/did-the-summer-shine-any-light-on-dodd- 
frank-whistleblower-land/. 
86. Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens, 2014 WL 3953672, at *6 (2d Cir. Aug.  14,  2014); 
Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., 2014 WL 3548278, at *2 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014) 
(interlocutory appeal denied); Bryan House et al., A Review of Recent Whistleblower 
Developments, JDSUPRA          BUS.          ADVISOR          (Oct.         3,         2014), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-review-of-recent-whistleblower-develop-40972/. 
87.    Siemens, 2014 WL 3953672. 
88. House et al., supra note 86. 
89. CHRISTOPHER MCEACHRAN, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, SECOND CIRCUIT DECIDES 
DODD-FRANK DOES NOT APPLY EXTRATERRITORIALLY, SKIPS ADDRESSING WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION FOR INTERNAL REPORTING (Sept. 23, 2014), available at 
http://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/sec/second-circuit-decides-dodd-frank-does-not-apply- 
extraterritorially-skips-addressing-whistleblower-protection-for-internal-reporting. 
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whistleblower protections when it declined to hear an interlocutory 
appeal.90 In December 2014, the SEC filed an amicus brief for  a 
pending appeal in the Third Circuit in support of overruling the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation.91 
Since there is only one federal court of appeals case, district 
courts have split on how to define “whistleblower.”92 In the Tenth 
Circuit, the District Court for the District of Colorado has decided two 
cases that contradict each other.93 Additionally, in the Second Circuit, 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York has multiple 
conflicting judgments.94 To promote uniformity in court decisions, 
courts should either correctly apply the Chevron process, or choose to 
follow the growing trend of new textualism95 and extend Dodd-Frank 
anti-relation protections both to employees who report only internally as 
well as those who report directly to the SEC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90. Bussing, 2014 WL 3548278, at *2; Yin Wilczek, Federal Appeals Court Declines 
to Hear Case on Dodd-Frank Definition of ‘Whistle-Blower’, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 
09, at 503 (Sept. 9, 2014) (noting that the Bussing case will continue in Nebraska district 
court). 
91. Steven Pearlman & Noa Baddish, SEC’s Second Amicus Brief on Whether Dodd- 
Frank Protects Internal Reports, PROSKAUER (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.whistleblower- 
defense.com/2014/12/22/secs-second-amicus-brief-on-whether-dodd-frank-protects- 
internal-reports/. 
92. See Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp, 2013 WL 3786643, at *6 (D. Colo. July 19, 
2013). But see Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., 2014 WL 2619501, at *9 (M.D. Fla. May 
12, 2014). 
93. See Wagner, 2013 WL 3786643, at *7 (following Asadi in holding violations must 
be reported to the SEC). But see Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 
2013) (holding the Anti-retaliation Section was an exception to the Definition Section of 
Dodd-Frank). 
94. See Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 531 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 
2014) (protecting internal reports under Dodd-Frank); Rosenblum v. Thomas Reuters 
(Mkts.) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2013); Murray v. UBS Secs., 
L.L.C., 2013 WL 2190084, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); see also Egan v. Tradingscreen, 
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist., 2011 WL 1672066, at*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). But see Berman v. 
Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115078, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014) 
(denying whistleblower protections). 
95. See infra Part IV.B. 
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IV. JUSTIFYING THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS WHO REPORT 
INTERNALLY 
 
 
A. Applying the Chevron Process 
 
When courts review statutory provisions such as the Dodd- 
Frank Definition Section and Anti-retaliation Sections where Congress 
has delegated legislative power to an agency, the court must defer to the 
agency unless the agency’s interpretation is “manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”96 To determine if the construction is permissible, courts must 
apply the two-step process set forth in Chevron.97 First, the court must 
ask whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”98 If Congress’s intent is clear, the court’s analysis ends.99 
However, if there is any ambiguity in the statute about  Congress’s 
intent, then the court must proceed to the second step of Chevron and 
ask if the agency’s interpretation of the statute is “reasonable.”100 In 
Chevron, the Court held that if Congress delegated the power to create 
and interpret laws, courts must defer to reasonable interpretations.”101 
Asadi did not follow the Chevron process, but instead used 
canons of statutory construction to avoid contradicting sections of the 
statute and surplusage.102 The Chevron court established that courts  
have the power to use “traditional tools of statutory construction” but 
Chevron only used legislative history to determine Congress’s intent.103 
The Asadi court failed to review Congress’s intentions for passing the 
Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections.104 Little evidence of Congress’s 
intent exists in its legislative history,105 but according to the Senate 
Report, The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, Dodd- 
 
96. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). 
97. Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: 
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive 
Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 576–80 (1998). 
98. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
99.    Id. at 842–43. 
100.    Id. at 844. 
101. Mank, supra note 97, at 578. 
102. Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013). 
103.    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 n.9, 851. 
104.    Asadi, 720 F.3d at 625. 
105.    Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., 2011 WL 1672066, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
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Frank “aims to motivate those with inside knowledge to come forward 
and assist the Government to identify and prosecute persons who have 
violated securities laws and recover money for victims of financial 
fraud.”106 The Fifth Circuit did not continue to Chevron step two and 
noted that it was not persuaded by Asadi’s argument for deference to  
the agency’s interpretation because the use of “whistleblower” in the 
federal regulations was inconsistent.107   Therefore, by failing to defer to 
a reasonable agency interpretation of the statute, Asadi did not correctly 
apply the Chevron two-step test. 
Asadi represents one of two possible interpretations of the 
relationship between the Definition Section and the Anti-retaliation 
Section.108 Some courts followed Asadi in holding that the Definition 
Section identifies who is a whistleblower, while the Anti-retaliation 
Section identifies what actions are protected for whistleblowers.109 
Contrastingly, the majority of courts choose not to follow Asadi and 
hold that the Anti-retaliation Section could be viewed “as a narrow 
exception” to the Definition Section.110 As a result,  in  most 
jurisdictions, an employee must prove he either reported to the SEC or 
that his disclosure was in the categories outlined in the Anti-retaliation 
Section.111 The Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions are facially 
ambiguous because they can be interpreted as contradictory.112 
Furthermore, “[t]he existence of these competing, plausible 
interpretations of the statutory provisions compels the conclusion that 
the statutory text is ambiguous in conveying Congress’s intent.”113 
Because the Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections are ambiguous, 
courts must proceed to the second step of Chevron. 
Under the second step of Chevron, the reviewing court should 
defer to the agency’s interpretation so long as it is “reasonable.”114    The 
 
106.   S. REP NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010). 
107.    Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630. 
108. Yang v. Navigators Grp, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
109. Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., 2014 WL 2619501, at *8 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 
2014). 
110.   Murray v. UBS Secs., L.L.C., 2013 WL 2190084, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) 
(quoting Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., 2011 WL 1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011)). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at *4. 
113. Id. (quoting Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
114. See Yang v. Navigators Grp, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y.  2014) 
(finding that the SEC’s interpretation of whistleblower definition was reasonable). 
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SEC promulgated regulations in 2011 that “defined certain terms critical 
to the operation of the whistleblower program . . . and generally 
explained the scope of the whistleblower program to the public and to 
potential whistleblowers.”115 According to the SEC’s regulations, 
individuals are whistleblowers if they have a reasonable belief of a 
possible securities law violation, and if they provided information in  
any manner described in the Dodd-Frank Anti-retaliation Section 
whistleblower provisions, which includes  internal  reporting.116  The 
SEC clarified how the “statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to 
three different categories of whistleblowers, and the third category 
includes individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities 
other than the Commission.”117 Specifically, the SEC clarified that the 
Anti-retaliation Section expands the definition of a whistleblower, 
giving employees the benefit of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation 
provisions for reports made both internally and to the SEC.118 
In determining the reasonableness of the SEC’s interpretation, 
the court must ask if the agency’s interpretation is “a permissible 
construction of the statute.”119 The court should not disturb  the  
agency’s interpretation unless it contradicts Congress’s intent.120 As 
previously stated, Congress intended for Dodd-Frank to encourage 
employees with information about potential securities law violations to 
come forward.121 In creating the regulations that were passed in 2011, 
the SEC recognized that “anyone can, and should, be able to report to 
law enforcement at any time, while at the same time recognizing that 
companies and whistleblowers have good reasons to want complaints 
reported  internally.”122       In  recognizing  the  value  and  efficiency  of 
 
115. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34300 
(proposed June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). 
116. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) 
(2014) (referring to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- 
Frank), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012)). 
117. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34304 
(emphasis added). 
118. Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 2014 WL 940703, at *15–16 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 11, 2014); Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34304 
(“However, the retaliation protections for internal reporting afforded by Section 
21F(h)(1)(A) do not broadly apply to employees of entities other than public companies.”). 
119. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
120.    Id. at 844. 
121.   S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010). 
122. Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech on Incentivizing 
Whistleblowers to Bring Fraud to Light (May 25, 2011). 
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corporate compliance programs in monitoring potential violations, the 
SEC regulations encourage whistleblowers to report internally when 
appropriate, but still allows whistleblowers to go directly to the SEC.123 
Furthermore, to encourage participation in internal compliance 
programs, the SEC regulations incentivize reporting internally by 
providing protections for whistleblowers while maintaining employees 
eligibility for the bounty program without reporting to the SEC.124 
Under Dodd-Frank, an employee must report information 
directly to the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower eligible for awards125 
under § 240.21F-9.126 The SEC’s regulations expand eligibility of the 
bounty program by providing that a whistleblower can receive a reward 
if the employee reports internally and the company later relays that 
information to the SEC.127 Moreover, if an employee chooses to report 
internally and later reports to the SEC within 120 days, the regulation 
contains a look back provision that deems the employee to have 
“provided information as of the date of [his] original disclosure.”128 
Furthermore, courts can consider participation, or lack thereof, in 
internal compliance systems as a factor in deciding whether to reduce or 
decline an award.129 
The SEC hoped that with these incentives, employees would 
report internally and that internal compliance programs could continue 
 
123. Mary Shapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Statement at SEC Open 
Meeting: Item 2 –Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011). 
124. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34300– 
01 (proposed June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). 
125. Asadi referenced the SEC’s regulations but claimed the inconsistencies in the way 
the regulations defined “whistleblower” did not strengthen the argument for an expanded 
whistleblower definition because it could not “reasonably effectuat[e] Congress’s intent.” 
Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2007). Section 240.21F-2(b)(1) seemed 
to expand the definition of a whistleblower while § 240.21F-9 still required the employee to 
report to the SEC. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. §§ 
240.21F-2(b), 240.21F-9 (2014). In Chevron, it was noted that the EPA could use a broader 
definition for some purposes and a narrower definition for other purposes. Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 856  (1984).  Similarly, 
“whistleblower” in § 240.21F-2(b)(1) refers to those who report a reasonable belief of a 
potential securities laws violations, while § 240.21F-9 definition limits “whistleblower”  
only to those who be eligible for an award under the original Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
provisions. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-2(b), 240.21F-9. Thus, deference should still be given to 
the SEC’s regulations. 
126. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9. 
127.    § 240.21F-4(c)(3). 
128.    § 240.21F-4(b)(iv)(7). 
129.    § 240.21F-4(a)(4). 
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to be a “tool designed to increase the effectiveness of the enforcement 
program.”130 If courts choose to ignore the SEC’s regulations and not 
expand whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions, it will be contrary to 
Congress’s stated intent. It does not make sense that Congress and the 
SEC would intend to incentivize reporting yet leave employees in 
situations where “individuals who take socially-desirous actions fail to 
be granted protection.”131 Therefore, the SEC’s regulations are a 
reasonable and permissible interpretation of the statute, and they should 
receive deference under the second step of the Chevron test. 
Accordingly, after a complete application of the Chevron doctrine, 
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions should be expanded to protect 
employees who are identified as whistleblowers in the Definition 
Section and to those who make internal disclosures under the Anti- 
retaliation Section without reporting to the SEC. 
 
B. Abandoning Chevron for New Textualism 
 
An emerging trend in regulatory interpretation involves the 
courts willingness to abandon the key principles of Chevron, thereby 
shifting the focus from a search for congressional intent to one  of 
textual clarity.132 In deciding “whether Congress had directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue,” a court may give less weight to the 
legislative history, and give more weight to the statute’s text.133  In 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,134 he 
argued that the legislative history of a statute should be ignored unless 
there is a justification for “a departure from the ordinary meaning of [a] 
word.” The only justification he deemed  strong enough  was  if there 
was evidence that the ordinary definition rendered the statute bizarre or 
absurd.135    This new method of statutory interpretation has been termed 
 
 
 
130. Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Opening 
Meeting—Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2012). 
131. Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
132. See Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the 
Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 173–74 (2012). 
133. Id. at 173–75 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). 
134.    490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
135. Id.; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 651 
(1990). 
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“new textualism.”136 
New textualist judges “may believe they are better able to 
interpret statutes than agencies are, and accordingly . . . [may] ignore  
the spirit of Chevron.”137 New textualist judges ignore  legislative  
history and instead examine the “statute’s structure, prior judicial 
opinions, established judicial ‘canons’ of statutory construction, 
administrative norms underlying the statute’s implementation, 
comparisons with the accepted interpretations of comparable statutory 
provisions, and the dictionary meanings most congruous with ordinary 
English usage and applicable law.”138 
Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC,139 is exemplary of the new 
textualism approach in determining whether an employee must report to 
the SEC to be protected by the  Dodd-Frank  whistleblower provisions. 
In Bussing, an employee brought a retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank, 
asserting her employer terminated her after reporting to her employer 
potential violations of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”)    rules    and    federal   securities   laws.140 The   court 
acknowledged the tension between the Dodd-Frank Definition Section 
and the Anti-retaliation Section, but the court did not, ultimately, reach 
the second step of Chevron and defer to the SEC’s regulation.141 
Although, Dodd-Frank has a statutory definition of 
“whistleblower,” the court held this was an unusual case where 
“whistleblower” should be given its ordinary meaning instead of its 
statutory definition.142 According to the court, if the statutory definition 
was used, “subsection (iii) [of the Anti-retaliation Section would] be 
rendered insignificant, and its purpose—to shield a broad range of 
employee disclosures—[would] be thwarted.”143 Because the statutory 
definition should not be controlling if it defeats the purpose of the 
statute, under the new textualism approach the court applied the 
dictionary    definition.144 Under     its     dictionary     definition,  a 
 
136. Eskridge, supra note 135, at 623. 
137. Mank, supra note 97, at 576 
138.    Id. at 538–39. 
139. 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 731 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) (finding that congressional intent 
was unclear, and that the court would have to “return[] to the text of the statute”). 
140.    Id. at 719–26. 
141.    Id. at 729. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144.    Id. nn.7–8. 
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“whistleblower” is “a person who tells police, reporters, etc., about 
something (such as a crime) that has been kept secret,”145 or an 
“employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law- 
enforcement agency.”146 By imputing the ordinary definition instead of 
the statutory definition, the court’s interpretation focuses only on the 
text in the statute, avoids any surplusage, and still reaches the same 
result as the SEC’s regulations.147 Consequently, even if  courts  
abandon the two-step process from Chevron, new textualism would still 
mandate that the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank incorporate 
the SOX provisions—ensuring protection for internal disclosures of 
corporate wrongdoing. 
 
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER 
POLICIES 
 
Under Dodd-Frank, “whistleblowers provide a vital early 
warning system to detect and expose fraud in the financial system.”148 
Since the passage of Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, the SEC has 
received almost 10,200 tips and complaints from whistleblowers.149 
With the number of reports increasing each year, it is important for 
whistleblowers to be protected from employer retaliation. Hence, all 
parties who could be involved in a Dodd-Frank whistleblower claim 
must recognize the current legal landscape and the implications of the 
lack of a consensus on the definition of whistleblower.150 
The split in the federal courts over whether Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower protections only apply to employees who report directly 
to the SEC impacts the decisions made by employees. First, the split 
affects where an employee will choose to report potential securities law 
violations. The court in Bussing argued that the narrow definition of a 
whistleblower was “under-inclusive” from the employee’s perspective, 
 
145. Id. (quoting Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary, s.v. “Whistleblower”, 
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/whistleblower (last visited Oct. 5, 2014)). 
146. Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1734 (9th ed. 2009)). 
147.    Id. at 730–31. 
148. 156 Cong. Rec. S4066 (daily ed. May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kaufman). 
149. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 2. 
150. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & JEREMY B. MERKELSON, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, TOP TEN 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES NOW SUBJECT TO SOX WHISTLEBLOWER 
LAWSUITS (2014), available at 
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/ttcfpcnstswl.cfm?makepdf=1. 
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because it “fails to account for the fact that employees tend to report 
matters internally before going to the SEC.”151 Employees who are not 
enticed by the potential financial gain or who are loyal to their 
companies may first report internally to give their companies the 
opportunity to remedy the problem before going to the SEC.152 If 
employees choose to report internally and not to the SEC, they would 
not qualify as whistleblowers under the strict Asadi interpretation of the 
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions. 
Secondly, if an employee is fired after reporting internally, the 
courts disagree on which retaliation claims the employee is entitled to 
bring. In jurisdictions that follow a narrow “whistleblower” definition, 
an employee can only bring a SOX retaliation claim if no report was 
made to the SEC.153 In jurisdictions that hold that the Dodd-Frank Anti- 
retaliation Section incorporates the SOX protection for internal 
reporting, employees may invoke the “plaintiff-friendly aspects of 
Dodd-Frank” that provides a longer statute of limitations, double back 
pay, and eligibility for the larger Dodd-Frank bounty program.154 It is 
unreasonable to think Congress intended to “offer a broad array of 
protections with one hand, only to snatch it back with the other, leaving 
behind protection for only a narrow subset of whistleblower,” yet this is 
the practical implication of Asadi for employees.155 
Employers also have to deal with practical implications of Asadi 
and subsequent decisions. However, regardless of how the Supreme 
Court eventually rules, the outcome will have a negative impact on 
employees.156 Companies, through their internal compliance programs, 
try to persuade employees to report internally first.157 But, even if the 
current SEC rules are given deference, some critics do not think that the 
SEC’s regulations are enough to encourage internal reporting.158    SEC 
 
151. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 732. 
152. Id. 
153. Shen, supra note 30 at 3. 
154. Id. at 4. 
155. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733. 
156. Shen, supra note 30 at 4. 
157. JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, CORPORATE 
LITIGATION; DODD-FRANK AND WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: WHO QUALIFIES? (Aug. 8, 
2013), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existing- 
content/publications/pub1637.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
158. See Kathleen Casey, Comm’r, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Adoption of Rules for 
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (May 25, 2011); Troy Paredes, Comm’r, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at 
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Commissioner Kathleen Casey expressed concern that  the 
whistleblower program promulgated under the current regulations 
“significantly underestimates the negative impact on  internal 
compliance programs.”159 If internal reports and disclosures are not 
protected, employees may skip internal reports and go directly to the 
SEC for a potential monetary award and for the protection of the Dodd- 
Frank anti-retaliation provisions.160 Anytime that internal reporting is 
bypassed, internal compliance programs lose the opportunity to quickly 
identify if there is a violation that needs to be fixed, or if there has just 
been a simple misunderstanding.161 Conversely, if the Dodd-Frank anti- 
retaliation provisions are expanded to those who report internally, 
employers face increased liability and vulnerability to retaliation claims, 
which could raise the cost of litigation and the amount of damages paid 
for retaliation claims.162 
Furthermore, the conflicting holdings regarding who is  
protected by the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions have a 
significant impact on the SEC. Due to decreased reliance on internal 
reporting, disclosures that could be handled more efficiently internally 
will instead be sent to the SEC.163 Commissioner Casey also believed  
the current SEC regulations “significantly overstat[e] [the SEC’s] 
capacity to effectively triage and manage whistleblower complaints.”164 
Ideally, the SEC would want fewer and higher quality tips, but with 
employees bypassing internal reporting, there could easily be a 
significant waste of corporate and government resources.165 Because of 
the greater number of disclosures, the SEC could become burdened with 
an overwhelming number of claims, likely resulting in the SEC’s 
inability to discover and address issues in a timely manner.166 
To resolve the conflict in the courts, the Fifth Circuit’s holding 
should   be   overruled   by   the   Supreme   Court.     This   would grant 
 
Open Meeting to Adopt Final Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of 
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011). 
159. Casey, supra note 158. 
160. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 157. 
161. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733; Casey, supra note 158; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 
157. 
162. Shen, supra note 30 at 4. 
163. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733. 
164. Casey, supra note 158. 
165. Id. 
166. Paredes, supra note 158. 
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employees the freedom to choose who they will report to, but will also 
assure protection from retaliation no matter what they decide. 
Simplifying the law by giving deference to the SEC’s broad definition  
of a whistleblower, would also ensure an efficient working relationship 
between the SEC and internal compliance programs.167 By viewing the 
Anti-retaliation Section as dictating categories of whistleblowers, not 
just actions protected for whistleblowers, employees will be protected if 
they report either internally or to the SEC.168 Giving deference to the 
SECs regulations would protect any disclosures made under the Anti- 
retaliation Section, allowing compliance departments to focus more on 
issues being reported and less on the potential  costs  of litigation.169  
This clarification of the whistleblower policies under the Dodd-Frank is 
supported by the correct application of the Chevron process and the 
doctrine of new textualism. By creating a safe environment for 
employees to come forward internally, and also allowing employees to 
go directly to the SEC, the federal whistleblower program will be able  
to reach its full potential to monitor the financial system. 
CAROLINE E. KEEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 157. 
168. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 157. 
169. Shen, supra note 30 at 4. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Cases Citing Asadi and Defining “Whistleblower” 
Case Facts Holding 
1st Circuit 
 
Ellington v. 
Giacoumakis, 977 F. 
Supp. 2d 42 (D. 
Mass. 2013). 
Employee reported to 
compliance officer that 
the company was 
potentially violating 
security laws by 
distributing misleading 
investment reports. 
Court found the SEC 
construction of the 
statute more 
persuasive and held 
Anti-retaliation 
Section protected 
internal disclosures. 
2nd Circuit 
 
Berman v. 
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 
2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 168840 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 
2014). 
Employee was 
terminated for 
reporting internally, 
and after he was fired 
reported potential 
violations to the SEC. 
Court required that 
the whistleblower 
report to the SEC to 
be protected based on 
the text of the statute 
and traditional canons 
of statutory 
construction. 
Ulrich v. Moody’s 
Corp., 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 138082 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
2014). 
Employee was based in 
Hong Kong and 
reported to the SEC. 
Court did not extend 
whistleblower 
protections 
extraterritorially or 
comment on reporting 
to the SEC. 
 
 
Yang v. Navigators 
Grp., Inc., 18 F. 
Supp. 3d 519 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
Employee reported 
potential shareholder 
fraud and potential 
violations of securities 
laws and regulations. 
Sought damages under 
both Sarbanes-Oxley 
and Dodd-Frank. 
Court upheld the SEC 
regulations resolved 
the ambiguity over 
the “whistleblower” 
definition and the 
employee was 
protected by Dodd- 
Frank even though 
she only reported 
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  internally. 
 
Ahmad v. Morgan 
Stanley & Co., 2 F. 
Supp. 3d 491 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
Employee made an 
internal report before 
the passage of the 
Dodd Frank. 
Court  would  not 
apply the Dodd Frank 
retroactively to 
retaliatory actions that 
would have been 
covered by SOX. 
 
 
Rosenblum v. 
Thomson Reuters 
(Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. 
Supp. 2d 141 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
Employee was fired 
after internal reports 
and reports to the FBI 
concerning insider 
trading. 
Court used Chevron 
analysis and deferred 
to the agency’s 
interpretation, that if 
the employee met the 
requirements of SOX 
they were covered 
under Anti-retaliation 
Section. 
 
Murray v. UBS 
Secs., LLC, 2013 
WL 2190084 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 
2013). 
Employee repeatedly 
told supervisors about 
research reports that 
were in violation of 
federal securities laws. 
Court held there are 
two plausible 
interpretations of the 
Anti-retaliation 
Section, so it is 
inherently ambiguous, 
and courts should 
defer to the SEC. 
 
 
Kramer v. Trans- 
Lux Corp., 2012 WL 
4444820 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 25, 2012). 
Employee reported 
concern about the 
conflict of interest, 
composition of the 
pension plan 
committee, and the 
failure to present the 
2009 amendment to the 
appropriate bodies. 
Court protected the 
whistleblower by 
deferring to the SEC’s 
interpretation of the 
Anti-retaliation 
Section. 
Egan v. 
Tradingscreen, Inc., 
2011 WL 1672066 
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 
2011). 
Employee reported 
diversion of corporate 
assets to another 
company. 
Court found that (iii) 
of the Anti-retaliation 
Section creates a 
narrow exception so 
that a plaintiff is 
required to show that 
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  he either provided 
information to the 
SEC or the 
disclosures fell under 
the four categories 
listed in (iii). 
 
 
Meng-Lin Liu v. 
Siemens A.G., 978 
F. Supp. 2d 325 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
Employee of a Chinese 
subsidiary who resided 
in Taiwan reported a 
potential violation of 
the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act. 
Court did not “wade 
into the debate” over 
the whistleblower 
definition because the 
Dodd Frank and SOX 
protections do not 
apply 
extraterritorially. 
 
 
Liu Meng-Lin v. 
Siemens, 2014 WL 
3953672 (2d Cir. 
Aug. 14, 2014). 
Employee of a Chinese 
subsidiary who resided 
in Taiwan reported a 
potential violation of 
the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act. 
Court did not mention 
the definition of the 
whistleblower. Found 
nothing  that 
suggested Congress 
intended 
extraterritorial 
application. 
3rd Circuit 
 
Safarian v. Am. DG 
Energy Inc., 2014 
WL 1744989 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 29, 2014) cert. 
granted (No. 14- 
2734). 
Employee disclosed 
overbilling that was not 
close enough related to 
fraud. 
Court does not weigh 
in on the definition of 
the whistleblower 
who failed to show 
that his disclosures 
fell under any of the 
protected actions of 
the Anti-retaliation 
Section. 
Khazin v. TD 
Ameritrade Holding 
Corp., 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31142 
(D.N.J. Mar. 11, 
2014). 
Employee reported that 
financial products 
offered to customers 
were not in compliance 
with relevant securities 
violations. 
Court took the 
majority view of the 
statute being 
ambiguous and held 
that the employee had 
sufficiently pled a 
Dodd Frank Act. 
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5th Circuit 
 
 
 
Asadi v. G.E. 
Energy United 
States, L.L.C., 720 
F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
Employee internally 
reported possible 
violation of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 
when a woman was 
hired to garter favor 
with a local official. 
Court applied a strict 
definition of a 
“whistleblower” as 
defined in the statute 
and did not apply the 
Dodd-Frank 
protections to the 
whistleblower 
because he did not 
report internally and 
to the SEC. 
6th Circuit 
 
Nollner v. S. Baptist 
Convention, Inc., 
852 F. Supp. 2d 986 
(M.D. Tenn. 2012). 
Employer reported 
concerns about 
potential bribery to his 
supervisors under the 
Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act. 
Court held that 
reported violations 
did not relate to 
violations of 
securities laws and 
was not protected by 
Dodd-Frank. 
7th Circuit 
 
 
Verfuerth v. Orion 
Energy Sys., 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
156620 (E.D. Wis. 
Nov. 4, 2014). 
Employer was the CEO 
but was removed by the 
board of directors after 
complaints of potential 
securities law 
violations. 
Court held there was 
no ambiguity in the 
statute and an 
employee did not fall 
within the protections 
of the Anti-retaliation 
Section because he 
did not report to the 
SEC. 
 
 
Zillges v. Kenney 
Bank & Trust, 24 F. 
Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. 
Wis. 2014). 
Employee reported 
violations of banking 
regulations. 
Acknowledges the 
disagreement among 
the federal courts but 
does not take sides on 
the issue. Failed to 
qualify as a 
whistleblower 
because he reported 
banking not securities 
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  law violations. 
8th Circuit 
 
Bussing v. COR 
Clearing, LLC, 20 F. 
Supp. 3d 719 (D. 
Neb. 2014) 
Employee reported 
violations of Financial 
Industry Regulatory 
Authority Rules as 
required under Rule 
820 as part of an 
investigation. 
Court applied the 
everyday definition of 
a whistleblower to 
provide protection to 
a full range of 
disclosures. 
9th Circuit 
 
 
 
Connolly v. Remkes, 
2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 153439, 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 
2014) 
Employee pled 
constructive discharge 
after she reported 
potential a violation of 
FINRA Rule 3240’s 
ban on broker 
payments into client 
accounts. 
Court adopted the 
majority view that the 
Anti-retaliation 
Section is ambiguous 
and that under 
Chevron, deference 
should be given to the 
reasonable SEC 
interpretation 
extending 
whistleblower 
protections. 
 
 
Banko v. Apple Inc., 
20 F. Supp. 3d 749 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) 
Employee reported to 
upper management 
fraud and 
embezzlement of 
company funds. 
Court dismissed 
whistleblower’s claim 
because it found no 
proof that the SEC 
issued its regulation 
because the Anti- 
retaliation Section 
was ambiguous. 
10th Circuit 
 
Azim v. Tortoise 
Capital Advisors, 
LLC, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22974 
(D. Kan. Feb. 24, 
2014) 
Employee reported 
fraudulent 
representations to gain 
potential investments 
and investors and false 
filings with the SEC to 
supervisors. 
Court pointed out that 
the 10th Circuit had 
not addressed the 
issue and allowed the 
employee to amend 
his complaint. 
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Wagner v. Bank of 
Am. Corp., 2013 
WL 3786643 (D. 
Colo. July 19, 2013) 
Employee reported of 
alleged violations of 
the Uniform Standards 
of Professional 
Appraisal Practice 
(USPAP). 
Court was concerned 
that expanding the 
whistleblower 
definition would 
render SOX moot so 
it quoted and 
completely agreed 
with Asadi. 
11th Circuit 
 
 
Englehart v. Career 
Educ. Corp., 2014 
WL 2619501 (M.D. 
Fla. May 12, 2014) 
Employee was placed 
on leave after voicing 
concerns about material 
misrepresentations, 
which violated 
Securities Exchange 
Act and anti-fraud 
provisions. 
Court followed Asadi 
and did not apply 
Dodd-Frank 
protections because it 
was Congress’s 
prerogative to define 
the term 
“whistleblower.” 
 
